The organisational fragility of the Indian National Congress in Kerala is most visible in its weak cadre culture and its heavy dependence on electoral arithmetic rather than continuous political mobilisation. This weakness is structural, not tactical. It does not arise from lack of supporters, social reach, or historical legitimacy, but from the way the party understands power and participation in a highly politicised society.
Kerala is a state where politics is lived daily. Parties are expected to exist not only during elections but as permanent social institutions. The Left understands this instinctively. Its cadres are embedded in trade unions, libraries, reading rooms, cooperatives, student movements, and local committees. Political identity is reinforced through routine engagement, ideological discussion, and everyday problem-solving. Congress, by contrast, has gradually retreated from this mode of politics, relying instead on alliances, vote-transfer logic, and anti-incumbency cycles to remain competitive.
This reliance on arithmetic over organisation has historical roots. Congress in Kerala inherited broad social coalitions across caste, religion, and class. These coalitions often function autonomously, delivering votes through community leadership rather than party structures. Over time, this reduced the incentive to invest in disciplined cadre building. Electoral success appeared achievable without continuous grassroots work, reinforcing a culture where elections mattered more than organisation.
The consequences of this approach are cumulative. Between elections, Congress presence at the local level weakens. Booth committees become inactive, issue-based mobilisation declines, and cadres disengage. Political work becomes episodic rather than sustained. When elections approach, the party attempts rapid mobilisation, relying on personalities, alliances, and media visibility. This produces short-term energy but not long-term loyalty.
Cadre weakness also affects political learning. Parties with strong grassroots presence constantly receive feedback from society. They sense shifts in mood, emerging grievances, and evolving aspirations early. Congress often encounters these shifts late, reacting after narratives have already solidified. This reactive posture makes the party appear slow and disconnected, even when it retains social sympathy.
Another dimension is ideological thinness at the cadre level. Without sustained political education or structured engagement, local workers operate without a shared intellectual framework. Messaging varies across regions and leaders. This inconsistency confuses supporters and weakens persuasion. Cadres struggle to defend the party’s positions because those positions themselves appear negotiable or unclear.
Youth engagement highlights this problem sharply. Kerala’s younger generation is politically aware, digitally connected, and demanding of authenticity. They are willing to engage with politics but expect meaning, agency, and impact. Congress’s organisational culture offers limited space for young cadres to exercise autonomy or shape narratives. Youth wings often function as appendages rather than incubators. As a result, young political energy either migrates elsewhere or disengages entirely.
The dependence on alliances further compounds this weakness. Congress’s electoral success frequently hinges on coalition partners and community-based support. While alliances are a legitimate democratic strategy, overdependence reduces incentive to build independent organisational strength. It also weakens bargaining power. A party that brings votes through organisation negotiates differently from one that relies on arithmetic goodwill.
This fragility becomes visible during crises. Floods, health emergencies, and social disruptions require rapid, decentralised mobilisation. Parties with cadres on the ground respond instinctively, building trust and visibility. Congress’s response is often uneven, dependent on individual leaders rather than institutional mechanisms. Missed opportunities during crises have long-term political costs.
Electoral data partially obscures this weakness. Congress remains competitive in Kerala because voters seek alternation and balance. Anti-incumbency works in its favour. However, competitiveness achieved through circumstance rather than strength is unstable. It does not build momentum; it resets the cycle. Each election becomes a fresh negotiation rather than an accumulation of trust.
Internally, weak cadre culture also reinforces elite dominance. Decision-making gravitates upward because there is little organised pressure from below. Grassroots voices are filtered through factional leaders rather than institutional channels. This disconnect deepens alienation among local workers, who feel like campaign instruments rather than political actors.
Comparatively, BJP faces organisational thinness but compensates with ideological clarity and central mobilisation. Congress lacks both cadre discipline and narrative sharpness, making organisational weakness more damaging. In a state that values political seriousness, this combination is costly.
The deeper issue is cultural rather than logistical. Congress historically viewed itself as a party of governance rather than mobilisation. This mindset made sense in an era of dominance. In a competitive, ideologically charged environment like Kerala, it becomes a liability. Governance credibility must be matched by movement capacity.
Rebuilding cadre culture does not require replicating Left structures, but it does require recognising that politics cannot be outsourced to elections alone. Continuous engagement, local leadership development, issue-based activism, and political education are not optional extras. They are prerequisites for relevance.
Without this shift, Congress risks remaining a party that wins when others fail rather than a party that leads proactively. Electoral arithmetic may keep it afloat, but it will not carry it forward.
